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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
15776

MICHAEL JOSEPH JIMINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in a Criminal Information
signed by Assistant Attorney General, Robert Wallace with
the offense of theft in violation of Utah Code Annotated
76-6-405 (Supp. 1977), for obtaining or exercising control
of the property of Alpha Distributing by deception and with
a purpose to deprive Alpha Distributing of its property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found the defendant guilty of the offense and
the defendant was sentenced on April 11, 1978, by Judge
Dean Conder to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison.

Both the District Court and the

Utah Supreme Court refused to enter a Certificate of Probable
Cause staying the execution of the commitment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the order of the
lower Court refusing to quash the Information and an order
of this Court declaring that the trial Court was without
jurisdiction and the judgment entered is void; or, in the
alternative an order awarding the appellant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Information filed and issued in the Third District
Court was signed by Robert Wallace, as Assistant Attorney
General on behalf of Robert Hansen.

(R.

).

The Salt Lake

County Attorney did not sign or file the Information.

The

entire proceedings in this case from the original Complaint

to and including the trial was prosecuted by the Utah Attcrru
General's Office.
t~

The first witness at the trial was Anthony Escobar,
President of Alpha Distributing Company and President of
Inter American Development.

(T.27).

He was also the sole

owner of Inter American Development, a corporation without
a board of directors or any other stockholders (T.27).

Mr.

Escobar first met the defendant on the first of June 1976 (T.
when Mr. Escobar approached Mr. Jiminez about taking over
a bankrupt professional soccer team the "Golden Spikers"
(T.84).

The defendant at the time was an officer in Tri

Delta Corporation and entered into some discussion with Mr.
Escobar about the acquisition of the professional soccer
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franchise by frontier, U.S.A., a corporation controlled by
Tri Delta Corporation (T.88,37).
According to Mr. Escobar, an oral agreement was entered
into between Alpha Distributing and the defendant on behalf
of Tri Delta Corporation to transfer all of the assets of
Alpha Distributing to Frontier, U.S.A., in exchange for
which Anthony Escobar would become President of Alpha Distributing Co., Vice-President of Frontier, U.S.A., and stockholder in Frontier, U.S.A.

(T.32,88).

Prior to the oral agreement there was discussion and
negotiations between the defendant on behalf of Frontier
U.S.A. and Anthony Escobar.

(T.86).

On direct examination,

Mr. Escobar stated that Mr. Jiminez made certain representations to him (T.18).

He stated Mr. Jiminez said that he was

the chairman of the board of Tri Delta Corporation, a multimillion dollar conglomerate, that Frontier U.S.A. 's stock
was trading at $5.00 per share, that he had millions of
dollars of Exxon and Phillips Petroleum oil stocks at his
disposal through a company called Kimberly Beers, that he was
the owner of Continental Bank and Trust Company, that he was
owner of a bank in Idaho, that he owned a company called
"Zero Cold" and that he had a project known as "White Barns"
(T.19-21).

He was also given proforma financial statements

for Tri Delta and frontier, U.S.A. (T.21, States Exhibit 2).
On cross examination, Mr. Escobar stated that he didn't
check on any of these statements or representations prior to
making the oral agreement (T.91).

He also said that he
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understood that the term "pro forma" was used in the finanwha~

cial statements meant the potential of the companies or
could be done given the right circumstances (T.95).

Mr. Escobar stated that the defendant, Mr. Jiminez on
behalf of Frontier U.S.A. paid to the soccer team $10,000.00
in the form of a cashier's check which was deposited in the
account of Tri Delta Corporation (T. 120).

Out of this

account and the account of Alpha Distributing Co., Mr.
Escobar paid the expenses incurred by the soccer team.
62, States Exhibit 5).

(T.~

The soccer team which was known as

the "Utah Pioneers" played four games in 1976 and made the
league play offs (T.85).

Other than the payment of $10,

Mr. Jiminez incurred additional obligations in the amounts
of $4,400.00 and $8,000.00 in relation to expenditures for
the soccer team (T.244).

The evidence also showed that Mr.

Escobar received a salary from Alpha Distributing during
July and August of approximately $3,000.00 and the use of
a Lincoln Mark IV (T.146).
Lyle Jenkins, an employee of Alpha Distributing, testified that Mr. Jiminez stated in his presence that he was the
owner of "Zero Corporation" and Frontier U.S.A.

(T .164).

He

also recalled Mr. Jiminez stating that he was "in hopes of
pulling together an exclusive franchise by acquiring the
Pioneer Soccer Team ... " and substantial sums of money into
Alpha Distributing (T.164).

After Mr. Escobar had resigned

and abandoned his position with Alpha Distributing, Mr.
Jenkins called Mr. Jiminez seeking some assistance as to
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what tc do with the company (T.173).

In November, 1976,

Lyle Jenkins sent $1,000.00 to Mr. Jiminez after disposing
of certain assets (T.169).

At the time of forwarding this

money, Mr. Jenkins recalled that he discussed obtaining an
attorney with Mr. Jiminez (T.174).

Mr. Jiminez stated that

this money was given to an attorney (T.250).
The State introduced the testimony of several witnesses
in relationship to the representations made to Mr. Escobar;
Fred Jensen, Robert Phillips, Keith Downs, Burt Elg, John
Kelly, Conrad Scheidell, and Emerson Burgess.
The defendant, Michael Jiminez took the stand in his own
behalf (T. 233 to T. 279).

He testified that he was Vice-

President and Chairman of the Board of Tri Delta Corporation
and that Tri Delta Corporation had an interest in Frontier
U.S.A.

(T.236).

He stated that the business of Tri Delta

Corporation was to be a representative under a finder's fee
arrangement to obtain borrowers in obtaining collateral.
He stated that he did not have anything to do with the day to
day operation of the team and that he had signed all the checks
on the joint account in blank before he returned to California
(T.240).
Mr. Jiminez said that Tri Delta Corporation had transferred $4,400.00 to Kimberly Beers, a New York Corporation
to obtain collateral for the purpose of borrowing the $38,000.00
necessary to pay the soccer team franchise (T.241).

Subse-

quent to this agreement, Mr. Jiminez learned that Kimberly
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Beers wasn't going to honor this agreement and Frontier
U.S.A. was unable to obtain the franchise (T.243).
He stated that there was never a formal consumated
merger between Tri Delta Corporation and Alpha

Distributi~ I

Co. and that the matter was merely under discussion by the
two corporations (T.247).

He stated that Tri Delta Corpon-

tion made an investigation of Mr. Escobar's Corporation,
Alpha Distributing and found that the debts far exceeded
their assets (T.249).
Mr. Jiminez or Tri Delta Corporation never personally [
received any money funds or property from Alpha
Co. (T.252).

Distributi~

He also explained that he never indicated to

Mr. Escobar that he owned any of the property as Mr. Escobar claimed that he did but was negotiating with several
of those businesses (T.251 - T.256).
After the conviction, the appellant filed a complaint

!

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Third Judicial District Court
action No. 31004 claiming that the plaintiff was being held
in custody pursuant to a void Information.

On May 11, 1978

Judge Peter F. Leary dismissed the complaint for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus on the grounds that this present appeal was
pending.
I

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO FILE
THE INFORMATION AND TO PROSECUTE PUBLIC OFFENSES IN SALT
LAKE COUNTY.
The appellant was arraigned on August 5, 1977 in the
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Third Judicial District Court and entered a plea of not
guilty.

The Information was filed and signed by Robert

R. Wallace, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of Robert
B. Hansen, Attorney General and was not officially authorized
by the Salt Lake County Attorney.
On February 24, 1978, after the attorney representing
the appellant at the time of arraignment had withdrawn, the
new attorney for the appellant filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the grounds the prosecutor had no authority
to file the Information.

The Motion was denied on March 1,

1978, by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, on the basis that
the Motion was not timely filed with the Court 's required
by Utah Code Annotated 77-16-2 and 77-23-10 (1953).
On March 6, 1978 the defendant was tried before a jury
in an action prosecuted by Robert R. Wallace, Assistant
Attorney General.

Prior to the trial, the attorney for the

appellant moved the Court to dismiss the action on the
ground that the Attorney General had no authority to act
as a public prosecutor.

This Motion was also denied by the

trial Court.
The power and authority of public prosecutor is vested
solely in the office of the County Attorney bu virtue of Utah
Code Annotated 17-18-1 (1953), which was enacted in 197.
That section states:
"17-18-1.
Powers--Duties--Prohibitions.-The county attorney is a public prosecutor
and must:
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all
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prosecutions for public offenses committed
within his county, except for misdemeanor
prosecutions under city or town ordinances
and appeals therefrom.
(3) The county attorney shall, when it does
not conflict with other official duties,
attend to all legal business required of
him in his county by the attorney general,
without charge, when the interests of the
state are involved.
All the duties and
powers of public prosecutor shall be assumed and discharged by the county attorney.
The county attorney shall appear and prosecute
for the state in the district court of his
county in all criminal prosecutions, and may
be interested and render such assistance as
may be required by the attorney general in
all such cases that may be appealed to the
Supreme Court; he shall attend the deliberations of the grand jury; he shall draw all
indictments and informations for offenses
against the laws of this state within his
county and shall cause all persons indicted or
informed against to be speedily arraigned.
(14)
If at any time, after investigation,
by and a finding and recommendation from the
district judge involved, that the county
attorney in any county is unable to satisfactorily and adequately perform his duties
in prosecuting a criminal case without additional legal assistance, the attorney
general shall provide such additional
assistance."
In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure places

up~

the County Attorney the authority to file Informations and
additional duties and responsibilities concerning the
decision to file an Information.

Utah Code Annotated

77-17-1 and 77-17-2 (Supp. 1977).
A review of Section 17-18-1 discloses that the legislature
took into account the Attorney General's Office is setting
up the system of prosecuting public offenses in Utah.

Sub-

section (14) of that statute sets forth conditions precedenc
to the involvement of the Attorney General's Office;

The
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district court judge must first make an investigation and
a finding and recommendation that the county attorney is
unable to satisfactorily and adequately perform his legal
duties in prosecuting a criminal case without additional
legal assistance.

Utah Code Annotated, 17-18-1 (14)(1953).

The authority and power of the Attorney General in
relationship to the County Attorney has been faced by the
courts of several neighboring states.
In State v. Woodahl, 495 P. 2d 182 (Mont. 1972), attorney
in Montana must conduct all prosecutions and file and sign
all Informations and the Attorney General did not have any
such power.

This decision was based upon

Secti~n

16-3101

of the Montana Code which is set forth in the opinion and
which is substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated 17-18-1.
In Woodahl, the Montana Supreme Court overruled the
contention that the Attorney General has any common law
power to file Informations.

The Court held that the statute

vesting authority in the County Attorney to file Informations
expressly supercedes and abrogates any common law power of
the Attorney General.
In relationship to the power of the Attorney General to
supervise the County Attorney the Court stated:

"This opinion is not to be construed as
any limitation on the supervisory powers
and control of the Attorney General over
the County Attorneys of this state as provided by law.
This opinion simply holds
that under the facts and circumstances
here, the Attorney General has no legal
power to file an Information signed only
by himself or to institute a criminal felony
prosecution in the District Court independent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
FundingAttorney."
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In~

v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 503 P. 2d

892 (Nev. 1972) the Nevada Supreme Court reached a similar
result on this issue in a habeas corpus action.

The Court

held that the Attorney General's Information was void for
lack of jurisdiction and discharged the defendant from
custody.

The Court stated:
"Indeed our statutory scheme invests
control of the Information process
in the District Attorney to the exclusion of
others. The legislature wisely has
forbidden dual control.
For example,
NRS 173.045(1) provides that all Informations shall be filed by the
District Attorney.
He may elect not
to file an Information after a preliminary
examination has occurred and the accused
has been held to answer, but must give
his reasons in writing for not doing
so.
NRS 173.055(2) ... These provisions
declare the legislative purpose to grant
the District Attorney of the proper county
control over the Information process.
The Attorney General is not mentioned,
and the conclusion is inevitable that
he simply is not empowered to initiate
a prosecution by Information independent
of the District Attorney."

In the opinion in Ryan, the Nevada Court found that the po1w
to "supervise" the District Attorney which the Nevada statute\

:::::b:: ::•r:::o::•: :::::·:;·::::: ::p:::::'::,•::n:::::t
of the District Attorney."

I

The Court held that the Attornev [

General's power to commence or defend a suit applies only
in the civil area and does not include the prosecution of
criminal cases.

Thus the Nevada Court rejected the same

arguments which are being made in the present case by the
Utah Attorney General.
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The Colorado Courts have reached a similar result.
People Ex Rel Witcher v. District Court, 549 P. 2d 778
(Colo. 1976) and Tooely vs. District Court, 549 P. 2d 774
(Colo 1976).
The appellant respectfully submits that the power and
authority over the informational process in the State of
Utah has been vested by the legislature with the County
Attorney and excludes any involvement by the Attorney General
except if the requirements of Section 17-18-1 are met.

In

the present case, the trial court did not make any finding
or recommendation that the County Attorney was unable to
satisfactorily or adequately perform his duties.

There is

no explanation in the record why this public offense was not
prosecuted by the County Attorney of Salt Lake County rather
than before Attorney General.

The Attorney General did not

have any authority to file the Information either under
Utah Constitution Article VII, Section 18 or Utah Code
Annotated 67-5-1 (1953).

The power to file Information has

been expressly and specifically granted exclusively to the
off ice of County Attorney by virtue of Utah Code Annotated
17-18-1 (1953).
II
THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NO
FORCE AND EFFECT AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE
APPELLANT WAIVED THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT.
The lower Court ruled that the Information was valid
because any objection to it was waived not because of any

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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finding that the Attorney General had the power to file
the Information.

Notwithstanding the fact that the

defendant-appellant had retained new counsel after the
arraignment, the lower Court found that the objections concerning the Information had been waived because not presented at the arraignment.
The appellant contends that the Information is the

on~,

pleading filed in a criminal case which gives the Court
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of
the action.

The authority for this proposition is found in

two early Utah cases, State v. Beddo, 22 Utah 432, 63 P. 96

(1900) and Connors v. Pratt, 28 Utah 258, 112 P. 399 (1910).
In State v. Beddo, 2 2 Utah 432, 63 P. 96 (1900) , the
defendant was convicted in a prosecution conducted under
our Information filed by the District Attorney under author!:
of Chapter 56 of the laws of 1899 and not the County AttornEI
The Court found that the law enabling the District' Attorney
to file the Information was unconstitutionally passed by t~
legislature and that the District Attorney, whose office
was created by the act, had no power to sign and file the
Information.

The Court then held that since the proper

official, the County Attorney, had not signed and filed the
Information under which the defendant was prosecuted, the le;
Court had no jurisdiction to try the case and the convictiOO
and sentence were void.
Ten years later in the case of Connors v. Pratt, 28

258, 112 P. 399 (1910), a person convicted in 1902 on the

I
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___,,,,,,.I

basis of an Information filed by the District Attorney
filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Following the authority of

State v. Beddo, the Utah Supreme Court held the Information
was void and of no force and effect because it was not signed
by the County Attorney.

The Court then found that the

petitioner was released from any legal restraint imposed
by such a void commitment.
The remaining question is whether the appellant waived
his right to contest the jurisdictional defect of the void
Information by not raising the matter at the time of the
entry of his plea.
Utah Code Annotated 77-23-10 (1953) which deals with
the effect of a failure to make a timely Motion to
Quash specifically provides that all objections which are
grounds for a Motion in Arrest of Judgment are not waived
by raising these objections at the time of arraignment.
In State v. Merritt, 247 P. 497 (1926) the Utah Supreme
Court stated that defects in the Information is jurisdictional
matter and properly a subject of a Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

In this decision, the Supreme Court cited State v.

Beddo for the proposition that jurisdictional issues could
be raised at any time.
Thus the appellant submits that this matter is not subject to being waived under 77-23-10 because of the jurisdictional nature of the objection.
In addition, Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, incorporated by Rule 8l(e) provides that sub-
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ject matter jurisdiction is never waived.

Because the

Information is the only pleading giving the Court subject
matter jurisdiction, the Court acquires no jurisdiction
to try a criminal action under a void Information.
As this Court found in Hakki v. Faux, 16 ~tah 2d 132, ~
396 P. 2d 867 (1964), if the proper procedure 1s not

follo~

for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court is
powerless to act in the matter.
The appellant submits that because the Attorney Genen:
did not have the power to file the Information, the lower
Court erred in not dismissing and quashing the Information
improperly filed in this matter.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED
TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE.
The appellant made a motion at the close of the case
in chief by the State to dismiss the Information (T.229).
The trial Court denied this motion (T.230).

In State v. Nuttal, 16 Utah 2d 171, 397 P. 2d 797 (196L,
this Court reversed a conviction of obtaining property by

~J

pretenses charged under Utah Code Annotated 76-20-8 (repealed 1973).

The Court in carefully reviewing the facts

in that decision found that the alleged victim did not
suffer actual loss and reversed the conviction in the lower
Court.

As in the present case, the facts involved concernec,

a business transaction entered into by two people and one ,:
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the frustrated parties became the complaining witnesses.
This Court has under the former statute, Utah Code
Annotated 76-20-8 (repealed, 1973), that if the purported
victim gets what he has bargained for there in no actionable
fraud or deception and the determination of this issue is
to be made immediately after the person parts with his
property.

State v. Casperson, 71 U. 68, 262 P. 294 (1927),

and State v. Howd, 55 Utah 927, 188 P. 628 (1920).
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-401 (1953) defines "obtain"
as used in the statute deficiency theft by deception to
mean an act "to ?ring about a transfer of possession or of
some other legally recognized interest in property ... "
In the present case, the appellant was originally
charged with obtaining the property of Anthony Escobar and
Alpha Distributing Co at the close of the State's case
the trial Court granted the defendant's motion that the
State did not introduce a prima facie case as to Anthony
Escobar (T.232).
The appellant respectfully contends that the State
did· not prove all of the elements of the offense and that
Mr. Jiminez acted in any way to obtain money from Alpha
Distributing.

On the contrary, the appellant submits that

the evidence did not show anything more than a risky joint
venture which failed causing a loss to both parties.
Mr. Escobar, as president and stockholder of Alpha
Distributing Co. stated that he approached Mr. Jiminez with
the idea of taking over a franchise of a bankrupt soccer
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team, an admittedly risky venture (T.84).

Mr. Escobar was

to manage the team and stated that according to the oral ag,
ment, he was to receive an ownership interest in the franch,
(T. 31 and 126).

He further stated that during the time

of July and August 1976, Alpha Distributing Co. was having
trouble paying its bills (T.102).
On the other hand, the Tri Delta Corporation and Mr.
Jiminez contributed about $22,000.00 to the expense of the
ill fated soccer team (T.120 and 244).

Neither he or any

of the corporations ever received any income from the socct
team or money from Alpha Distributipg Co., the alleged vict
(T.252).
Frontier U.S.A. was negotiating to obtain a franchise
which was conditionally granted but never obtained (T.259 a
185).

The entire soccer league eventually went out of bus-

iness (T.274).
A review of evidence by this Court will show that the
evidence did not warrant the trial Court in allowing the
case to be submitted to the jury.

The State did not prove

that the appellant ever obtained any property of the

alle~

victim and that this was anything more than a failed

joi~

business venture.

I
!

The Court should therefore reverse the

lower Court.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was committed in this case on the basis
of a void Information and therefore this Court should

rev~

the decision of the lower Court in not quashing the Infor;;I'~
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and order that the lower Court dismiss the Information
and commitment entered against the appellant.

Secondly,

the State did not introduce sufficient evidence to allow
the case to be presented to the jury; and, therefore, this
Court should reverse the lower Court's denial of the appellant's
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative award the appellant
a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
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